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CHAPTER IV 
"DURING EFFICIENT SERVICE 
AND GOOD BEHAVIOR" 
Municipal civil service failed to accomplish its main objectives, but it  
did provide Houston police officers with a legal basis upon which to initiate 
suits. Occupational stability, denied police officers by municipal authorities, 
was sought by individual officers in the courts. By the terms of the civil 
service provision in the City Charter of 1897, tenure of office for "all em- 
ployes in the fire, police and health departments except department 
heads.. .depended upon efficient service and good behavior." Dismissals 
were forbidden unless "an offense of sufficient gravity" could be proven.' 
The gravity of the offense was decided at first by the Police Board and after 
1914 by the Civil Service Commission. Violations of this rule provided 
police officers with the opportunity to seek redress in the courts. 
The first case to reach the courts occurred in 1901 with the firing of 
police officer J.D. Proctor by Chief of Police John J. Blackburn,* Proctor's 
dismissal, which would not have evoked comment before the inclusion of 
the civil service provision in the charter of 1897, now provoked a crisis that 
had far-reaching consequences for civil service in Houston and for the in- 
stitutional development of the police department. 
Claiming that he was summarily removed in violation of civil service 
rules, Proctor appealed Blackburn's action to the Police, Fire, and Health 
Board. The Board tried his case, found him not guilty of misconduct, and 
ordered his reinstatement. Mayor John D. Woolford, who viewed the 
Board's decision as a threat to his control of the police department, en- 
couraged the police chief to refuse Proctor's reinstatement. Woolford con- 
tended that the Board's decision conflicted with the powers granted the 
mayor by the city charter. He argued that since "the term of office of mem- 
bers of the Police force is not fixed by the Charter or Ordinances, police 
officers.. .are subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power 
which. . .is the mayor."3 
At this point Proctor presented the question to the courts for set- 
tlement. He appealed to the district court for a writ of mandamus. The 
Court upheld the mayor's position and refused to grant the writ.4 An appeal 
was then taken to the Court of Civil Appeals, where a judgment was 
declared in favor of Proctor's reinstatement. Ostensibly, the decision was a 
victory for civil service. The right of the Police, Fire, and Health Board to 
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"make all necessary rules and regulations for the..  .police department" 
was supported.5 Chief of Police Blackburn's discharge of Proctor was 
declared to be illegal and in violation of the civil service procedures 
stipulated in the city charter. The Court thereby confirmed that Proctor was 
indeed protected by civil service rules and by so doing, in principle, 
established the Board as the appropriate administrative agency to regulate 
the operation of the police department. 
With the same stroke of the pen, however, the court undermined civil 
service as a practical instrument of reform and established itself as the 
bulwark of municipal supremacy. Noting that Proctor had been appointed 
on October 19, 1900, and dismissed September 24, 1901, the Court re- 
minded Woolford and Blackburn that policemen defined in the strictest 
terms were state officers6 and as such were authorized by the Texas State 
Constitution to serve a two-year term of office during "efficient service and 
good behavior." Proctor was therefore entitled to hold his position and 
receive his salary for two years unless evidence was presented to the Police 
Board of a violation of "sufficient gravity" to warrant dismissal.7 The up- 
shot of the decision was that at the completion of his two-year term, Proc- 
tor's continuance in office would depend on his reappointment. 
The Proctor case was important because i t  marked the first instance in 
which a Houston police officer contested his dismissal from lhe force and 
was upheld in court on the basis of a civil service provision. One advantage 
was gained by policemen as a result of the Proctor case. The city could be 
held liable for ousting police officers in violation of civil service regulations; 
although such liability was applicable only for a two-year term, the ruling 
nevertheless was a definite departure from past experience. Prior to the 
Proctor decision, police officers were reluctant to bring suit against the city, 
but following it, court dockets were crowded with police cases. Officers, en- 
couraged by Proctor's success, risked the expense of initiating litigation to 
regain back salaries. 
The liability of Houston in such cases was conceded by the city at- 
torney. As he pointed out in a memo of April 22, 1902, the principle was 
established that the salary attached to a public office was a legal reward for 
fulfilling the duties of that office. A person legally holding the position was 
therefore entitled to full compensation for the remainder of his two-year 
term when, as had been the case with Proctor, he was illegally prevented 
from performing his duties by a superior officer. In such instances the at- 
torney advised full reimbursement.* 
The case is most significant for what i t  failed to accomplish. Arbitrary 
dismissals of police officers were not halted. Nor did the decision strengthen 
the position of the Police, Fire, and Health Board as the legal agency for 
deciding the appeals of suspended or dismissed policemen, firemen, and 
health officers. Mayor Woolford and h b  successors refused to relinquish 
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their control of police appointments and dismissals. Although according to 
the 1897 charter and subsequent charters the mayor was allowed to remove 
only department heads, the restraint was merely nonlinal. Instead of the 
mayor's directly removing the rank and file as in the past, dismissal was 
now usually accomplished through department heads. 
One year after the Pl.ot,/or. decision the civil service law was again 
tested when a series of s u i ~ s  was filed by fifteen former police officers 
seeking recovery of salaries lost as a result of their dismissals from the 
force.9 In the rulings in these cases the courts attempted to define the 
limitations of civil service applicability. The  judges sought to reconcile the 
contradition of the civil service provision of tenure during "efficient 
service and good behavior" and the two years of service limitation in the 
Texas State Constitution. Judgments totalling $19,683 were awarded 
twelve of the officers by the Sixty-First District Court for the period from 
the date of their dismissals to the termination of their two-year terms.10 All 
the decisions were taken to the Appeals Court on writs of error either by 
the city or  by officers dissatisfied with the amount of settlement.' 1 
The  cases were divided into categories. One group based the claim for 
recovery on the Pt.oc.tor decision, and a second group, represented by G u s  
Albers and J.A. Estes, sought to expand the  protection of civil service 
beyond that established in the Proctor case.12 The  decisions in these two 
cases were of particular importance because of the implications they raised. 
The  suits involved the right to recover salary beyond the original two-year 
period of service. In the Proctor. case, recovery concerned only service per- 
formed within the two-year period. In effect, the cases pressed the issue of 
what constituted a police officer's tenure of office under the civil service 
clause of "efficient service and good behavior." The  first of the cases, that 
of Albers, involved a police officer who had allegedly been wrongfully 
dismissed by order of the mayor. Upon reviewing the case, the city council 
recommended that Albers be reappointed, but Chief of Police Blackburn 
refused to reinstate him. Albers, who was first appointed in 1898 and 
dismissed in 1902, sought recovery for the portion of his salary lost during 
the period of his dismissal that involved his service beyond the expiration 
date of his original appointment. The  district court awarded Albers $663, 
but the city appealed and the decision was reversed.13 
According to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, Albers, though 
dismissed illegally, was not entitled to recovery because no proof existed 
that h e  was ever reappointed to office. "It follows," the Court continued, 
"that an appointment upon the police force of the city only gives the ap- 
pointee a right to the office for a term of two years, and when that term ex- 
pires, unless he is reappointed, he  ceases to be  de jure officer, and the 
liability of the city for his salary as such officer ceases." His service on the 
police force and the  acceptance of his service by the  city made him a 
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clefacro officer entitled to compensation. Since Albers had not been reap- 
pointed, however, the court ruled that when the city terminated his services 
i t  incurred no liability for the salary he would have earned even though the 
dismissal violated the procedures set forth in the civil service provision.14 
Unlike Albers, Estes had been illegally ousted within the two-year 
period of his service. The district court awarded him his salary for that por- 
tion of the two-year term during which he had been dismissed but at the 
same time refused to support Estes's claim for compensation for the period 
from the date of his ouster to the date of his trial.'$ 
The case was appealed by the city and cross-assignments were presen- 
ted by Estes. Estes maintained that he was entitled to recovery beyond the 
two-year term because, under the existing civil service regulations, his 
tenure was commensurate with good behavior and efficient service and he 
could not be removed from office except with the approval. of the Police, 
Fire, and Health Board. His dismissal, Estes asserted, was in violation of 
these rules. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's judgment for 
Estes, but rejected his claim of extended protection under civil service. The 
court held that the civil service rules were applicable only for the two-year 
term set by the state constitution. The liability of the city was confined to 
that specific period. The court contended that the effect of the provisions 
cited by Estes, if accepted, would "constitute an office for life, if good 
behavior and efficient service were commensurate.. . .It has been settled 
that, since the Constitution limits the terms of all officers not otherwise 
fixed to two years, this provision will be construed to fix tenure at the con- 
stitutional term, subject to the provision of removal for cause during that 
time.. . .The unconstitutional provision may be discarded without nullifying 
the entire law."i6 
Civil service laws could not circumvent the state constitution by 
allowing continuance in office to be assumed at the end of each two-year 
term because of satisfactory performance. Tenure "during good behavior" 
was only valid if applied within the two-year term. If the letter of the law 
was to be adhered to, the service of police officers was to terminate at the 
expiration of the two-year term, with reappointment following the com- 
pletion of a qualifying examination. In practice those policemen who were 
favored by the administration were allowed to continue without formal ap- 
pointment. In later years, all pretense of making official appointments was 
abandoned, and appointees served as de facto police officers. Matters were 
simplified since neither entrance nor qualifying examinations existed. Police 
service became at best a temporary occupation. 
As political patronage became an increasingly important aspect of police 
service after 1920 and civil service became increasingly subservient to the 
patronage system, appeals to the commission became a rarity and recovery 
of salaries unknown. Most officers realized the futility of exercising the 
right of appeal and accepted political firings stoically. Tenacious police of- 
ficers who pursued a hearing found that their dismissals were upheld by the 
commission.'7 Encouraged by the ruling in the Estes case and the generally 
unsympathetic stance of district court judges toward the civil service laws, 
the city council and mayor were inclined to risk lawsuits and continued to 
refuse compensation. 
Compensation to policemen because of illness or injury was not af- 
fected by these decisions. Relief was granted at the discretion of the city 
council. Such petitions were usually given more consideration than petitions 
for loss of salaries, but no set rule existed to insure a consistent policy. No 
cases of this type were ever tested in the courts, even those which involved 
job-connected injury or illness. 
During the interval between the 1904 Estes decision and 1933, no ef- 
fort was made by police officers to challenge the patronage system in the 
courts. Although the Proctor decision and other rulings established the right 
of police personnel to contest illegal firings, much of the significance of this 
achievement was lost, for the Estes decision, supported by subsequent 
rulings, mortally wounded civil service as an instrument of police reform. 
The two-year tenure of office as strictly interpreted by the courts placed ser- 
vice in the police department at the pleasure of each new administration. 
Moreover, the right to challenge illegal dismissals was undermined by the 
enactment of a civil service rule in 1914, which stipulated that appeals to 
the district court from decisions of the Commission could be made only on 
the grounds that the Commission had acted with gross negligence or with 
prejudice. Since such charges were generally impossible to prove, appeals 
were seldom attempted. The  expense of attorney fees and the narrow legal 
interpretation given civil service laws by the courts deterred all but the most 
determined men. 
No cases involving violations of the civil service laws reached the 
courts between 1905 and 1933. The re-election of Mayor Holcombe in 
1933, however, heralded a series of suits filed by police officers during the 
next two years. Holcombe, in his effort to re-establish his political influence 
in the police and other departments of the city, committed numerous 
violations of the civil service rules, dismissing or demoting over a hundred 
city employees during the first weeks of his administration. Thirty of the 
employees filed suit for reinstatement.18 The undisguised political 
motivation of the mayor's actions encouraged appeals to the courts. At one 
point, the mayor boldly declared during an interview with a newspaper 
reporter that he intended to oust a police captain for political reasons.l9 
Shortly thereafter the mayor acted upon his intentions. In another instance 
Holcombe notified an officer in writing that he had personally ordered his 
dismissal from the department, thus breaking with the tradition of firing 
through the department head, which had become the practice following the 
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Proctor decision.20 Since the HoIcombe dismissals ignored even the 
minimal authority of civil service as set forth in the Proctor, Albers, and 
Estes decisions, hope lingered that the new administration would be held 
accountable for at least the two-year tenure guaranteed police officers 
"during good behavior and efficient service."21 Moreover, the civil service 
structure established by the ordinance of 1914 had not yet been tested in 
the courts. The amendmentto the city charter of 1913, unlike the civil ser- 
vice charter amendment of 1897, was followed by the enactment of an or- 
dinance outlining a civil service program in detail. The ousters by Holcombe 
provided an opportunity to evaluate the applicability of the ordinance. 
Three cases determined the outcome of the court test. In two of the 
cases the courts dealt with the issues of dismissal procedures and ap- 
pointment requirements under civil service. The third case involved both 
issues, but reached the court as a consequence of the efforts of two officers 
to expose the department's involvement in the city's gambling operations. 
Together the decisions in these cases determined the legal status of the 
police department under municipal civil service and the extent of the 
powers of the mayor over the administration of the department. 
The first case arose in 1933 with the dismissal of W.R. "Bobby" Ellis 
from the police department. Litigation in the case lasted two years and was 
carried from the district court to the state supreme court. Ellis had been ap- 
pointed during the Monteith administration as superintendent of iden- 
tification in the police department, a position which he held from 1929 until 
his dismissal in 1933. At that time, HoIcombe took office following a hard- 
fought election and proceeded to reorganize the police department by ap- 
pointing his campaign manager George E. Woods to the position of Direc- 
tor of the Department of Public Safety. Shortly after Woods assumed office, 
Holcombe instructed him to oust Ellis as superintendent, and Ellis sub- 
sequently filed for a hearing with the civil service commission. In the mean- 
time Holcombe appointed Henry E. Keller, a relative of his wife, to Ellis's 
position and notified the latter that he had been removed by his personal 
instructions.22 
Hofcombe contended that several sections of the city charter of 1905 
empowered him to remove at his discretion any city employee or officer 
with the exception of an elected official.23 According to Holcombe's 
argument, the civil service amendment of 1913 did not supersede or curtail 
the prerogatives of the mayor as set forth in the charter. Although the civil 
service amendment stated that city employees could be dismissed only by 
the heads of departments, Holcombe's view was that the mayor or city 
council could directly order removals without granting a civil service com- 
mission hearing. Appeals to the commission were available only to em- 
ployees dismissed by department heads, as would be the case in the 
discharge of police officers fired by the chief of police. Employees classified 
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as appointed officers or officers whose positions were created by ordinance 
or charter served only at the discretion of the mayor. This latter allegation 
was directed specifically at Ellis, who, the mayor asserted, was a city officer 
and not a state officer subject to the two-year tenure provision of the con- 
stitution.24 Holcombe's argument, if accepted, would have eIiminated even 
the principle of civil service and would in fact have legalized the practices of 
political patronage that had dominated the operation of the police depart- 
ment since its earliest days. 
The issues were presented to District Judge Roy F. Campbell in June 
1933, when Ellis filed for a writ of mandamus after he failed to receive a 
hearing before the civil service commission. Campbell sustained the city's 
general demurrer,25 ruling that the mayor's unlimited power to dismiss any 
city employee except an elected official remained valid under the provisions 
of the 1905 city charter. The right of a city employee to appeal to the com- 
mission was applicable only when a dismissal was ordered by a department 
head. Moreover, Campbell denied that a writ of mandamus could be issued 
against the city council, mayor, or civil service director.26 CampbeIl's ruling 
justified Holcombe's boast that once he removed a civil service employee, 
that employee "stay[edI fixed" and was not entitled to appeal his case to 
the commission.27 
The decision was appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, however, 
with Ben Campbell, the former mayor, under whose administration the 
civil service amendment of 1913 was enacted, acting as a special counsel for 
Ellis. In its opinion of February 1934, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed 
the district court's decision. Chief Justice R.A. Pleasants, in a lengthy 
decision, examined those sections of the civil service amendment pertinent 
to removal procedures and each section of the city charter upon which the 
administration asserted its removal power. Pleasants found that the 
provisions of the civil service ordinance could only be construed as 
repealing the original charter articles relating to the removal powers of the 
mayor and city council. "It seems clear to us," he declared, "that these 
provisions of the amendment [establishing the procedures for removing city 
employees] comprehend the entire subject of removing city employees 
classified under the civil service amendment, and create an independent 
and exclusive method for the removal of such employees."28 
Particular attention was devoted to political patronage. While the court 
conceded that "ir was human for the mayor to prefer his political friend for 
any position of employment by the city at his disposal," Holcombe was 
reminded that such reasoning was "certainly no cause for removal of a 
faithful efficient public employee protected by the civil service amend- 
ment.. , .The justice and wisdom of. . .civil service legislation is ap- 
parent." The court affirmed Ellis in his right to a writ of mandamus.s9 
The city appealed to the State Supreme Court, which sustained the 
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opinion of the Court of Appeals and returned the case to the district, where 
hearings were begun on points of law and fact. Ellis amended his original 
petition to seek compensation for his lost salary in addition to rein- 
statement. Ellis won the points of law and later during the hearings on the 
points of fact he had the satisfaction of hearing Judge AHen Hannay 
threaten to jail and "fine to the limit" the city attorney, Mayor Holcombe's 
lawyer, and the Director of Civil Service for disregarding a court subpoena 
for civil service records.30 Judge Hannay's stern warning was the only real 
satisfaction the advocates of an effective civil service received from the 
tedious years of litigation, for during the second hearing on points of fact 
Ellis suddenly collapsed and died of a heart attack. His untimely death 
brought the litigation to an inconclusive end. Ellis's wife resumed 
proceedings and filed suit for compensation for her husband's lost salary; 
she was granted more than $4,000 by the city council, which was anxious to 
terminate further litigation.31 
The opinion in the Ellis case reaffirmed the Proctor decision that police 
officers were entitled to a two-year tenure with dismissals subject to the 
procedures prescribed in the civil service regulations. Ellis's lawsuit was 
concerned with the right of a civil service employee to receive a hearing 
before the civil service commission and not with the merit of the dismissal. 
The court nevertheless addressed itself to the legality of civil service and 
the responsibility of the mayor and city council to adhere to its regulations. 
Holcombe's extravagant claims of his removal power over police officers 
were cited by the court and rejected, but it noted that final disposition of 
the question would have to be settled strictly on the merits of Ellis's 
removal.32 Ellis's deal h terminated further litigation, and the question of 
the merit of the ouster was not ruled upon by the courts. While litigation in 
the Ellis case was in progress, however, the issue of the mayor's power to 
dismiss a civil service employee was moving toward a resolution in the E.F. 
Grota case. 
In 1933 Grota, a warrant officer responsible for assisting the clerk of 
the Corporation Court in the preparation and issuance of writs and sum- 
monses, received notification of his discharge from the police department 
soon after Holcombe was elected mayor. Grota charged that his ouster was 
motivated by his vote against Holcombe and not, as claimed by Holcombe, 
because of the need to reduce the city's expenditures. The mayor, Grota 
asserted, was attempting to destroy civil service in order to organize a 
political machine. Grota pointed out that even if economic conditions had 
been responsible for his dismissal, the action was still illegal, for according 
to civil service regulations only those persons placed last on the list of 
classified civil service employees could be removed, and Grota's service 
with the city had been longer than many of the mayor's recent appointees. 
In his petition, Grota sought a writ of mandamus to compel the civil service 
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commission to grant him a hearing. He also requested an injunction to halt 
the mayor's interference in the operation of the civil service commission.33 
Grota's assertion that he was a classified civil service employee compelled 
the court to examine the merits of the removal. 
City attorney R.R. Lewis did not dispute Grota's charge of political 
patronage in the general demurrer filed for the city, Lewis advanced the 
argument that even if Grota's assertions were true, his removal was never- 
theless within the mayor's prerogative since Grota, like all other police 
department personnel, was not a classified civil service employee. Lewis 
contended that the civil service charter amendment approved by the voters 
in 1913 had abolished the city's police department as it had existed prior to 
approval of the amendment. Re-creation of the department to conform to 
the civil service amendment depended on the enactment of ordinances by 
the city council. Since such action had not been taken by the council, the 
argument continued, police officers were not officers de jure and were sub- 
ject to dismissaf at the mayor's discretion. Specifically, i t  claimed the or- 
dinance creating the position of warrant officer was imprecise in that it failed 
to state the exact number of such officers and the mode of appointment.34 
Furthermore, Grota did not obtain his position through a competitive 
examination as prescribed in the civil service amendment, which stated that 
classified civil service employees first had to perform satisfactorily in an 
"open, competitive and free examination." The amendment assigned the 
civil service commission the responsibility of devising and administering the 
examinations.35 Since the civil service commission had failed to fulfill its 
responsibility, however, appointments to the police force and other city 
departments were usually made by the mayor or department heads. Con- 
sequently, police officers were not classified civil service employees and 
could be removed at the mayor's discretion. 
The case was argued in district court in October 1935. Judge Ewing 
Boyd in a decision issued in November sustained the city's general 
demurrer and found that Grota's dismissal had not violated civil service re- 
gulations. Concurring with the city attorney, Boyd held that the civil service 
commission had failed to carry out the provisions of the charter 
amendment, and the city council had not enforced compliance with those 
ordinances i t  had already enacted. Houston's civil service was a framework, 
Boyd asserted, without the substantive detail to make it a functioning 
system. A complete reorganization of civil service by the city council was 
required. Boyd charged that the section in the city charter pertaining to the 
creation of the corporation court and its officers (among them warrant of- 
ficers) failed to specify the duties of the officers or the number of positions 
for that classification, making i t  therefore incompatible with civil service 
regulations.36 Grota could cIaim the status of an officer de jure under the 
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civil service protection only if the duties of his position were defined by or- 
dinance. An officer, the judge asserted, could not claim the benefits of the 
law when the law was not complied with. Boyd recognized that stability was 
required in the police department, but he did not believe it could be ob- 
tained through the existing civil service program, as he indicated in his 
closing remarks: 
The thing that would have rendered ~t [civil servlcel stable was to remove the 
indefiniteness that theretofore existed in reference to the number of persons that 
should constitute the roll of policemen; that should const~tute the number of 
warrant ofticers. The people were, and are, entitled to know how many persons 
were going to be on their payroll, and up to this tlme no ordinance declares how 
many policemen, how many warrant officers have been created. No ordinance 
informs us whether it consists of a large number of officers and one policeman or 
of the commanding officer and a thousand privates. The indefiniteness still exists 
and the Civil Service program has failed because of the failure of the City Council 
to do that thing which the ordinance, and every intendment, implication and 
suggestion of the ordinance called on them to do.37 
Although the decision was appealed, the ruling had an immediate im- 
pact on the police department as well as on the other city departments that 
were under civil service classification. In effect, even the appearance of civil 
service regulations was removed from the administration of rhe depart- 
ment, since application of the decision extended to all members of the 
police force who had not been officially reappointed to their positions. The 
indefiniteness that the court noted in the creation of the position of warrant 
officer also applied to all positions within the department except chief of 
police. As a result of the decision, Holcombe became in fact "the boss of 
the police department by self-decree," as his control over the department 
was later described.38 In effect, the ruling set the occupational status of 
Houston police officers back to the nineteenth century. 
The Grota decision, while upholding the dismissal, was a two-edged 
sword, for the Holcombe administration was now burdened with the task of 
correcting the defects in the civil service program, at least to the point of 
satisfying the court. A major defect citied by Judge Boyd was the civil serv- 
ice commission's failure to  conduct competitive examinations. Plans were 
made for instituting examinations for all municipal employees, but op- 
position to the plan by the incumbent city employees postponed their im- 
plementation.39 The second defect, which was the basis for Boyd's decision, 
was the indefiniteness of the ordinance creating positions in the police 
department. To remedy the imprecision of the ordinance, the city's legal 
department prepared an amendment to the city charter stipulating that no 
appointment to a position could be made unless the position had been 
created by ordinance. If the position required more than one officer, the or- 
dinance would also have to state the maximum number of officers per- 
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mitted to hold the position.40 
The proposed changes became part of twenty-six amendments offered 
to the voters in October 1938 as a plan for improving the quality of city 
government. All twenty-six were rejected, and the civil service program 
continued without major alterations until 1948.41 The Groja decision 
did not improve the quality of civil service protection for police officers. 
Instead, because it invalidated the existing program-though it was 
inadequate-police officers now found themselves without a basis for 
legal recourse against the most irresponsible actions of the mayor or chief 
of police. 
Their vulnerability was clearly demonstrated by the circumstances 
surrounding the suspension of officers S.T. Roe and W.L. McGrew in 
October 1935. Roe and McGrew were suspended after they charged that 
the gambling laws were not being enforced by the police department and 
that information obtained from a local gambler indicated that Chief of 
Police B.W. Payne was involved in the city's slot-machine operations. In an 
affidavit to the city council the officers petitioned for an investigation into 
the department and its possible involvement in gambling operations. Payne, 
denying the charges, cited the recent demotion of both men from the rank 
of detective to patrolman as the reason for the charges, and ordered Roe 
and McGrew suspended. Other officers who had assisted in preparing the 
affidavit were also scheduled for suspension or demotion on charges of cur- 
sing, using abusive language, inefficiency, and insubordination. Shortly af- 
ter their suspension both men were taken from their homes under the 
escort of police detectives to the mayor's office, where they were placed un- 
der guard until questioned about the charges. Following their session in the 
mayor's office, the men sought to file charges against Payne in Justice of 
the Peace courts. Charges were rejected, however, by Judges Tom Moes 
and J.M. Roy pending possible inquiry by the grand jury.42 
A confusing series of events followed. Investigations were immediately 
launched by the grand jury, civil service commission, and city council, with 
the latter suspending Payne until the conclusions of the inquiries. The 
suspension was effected over the veto of Holcombe, who insisted that 
Payne remained the lawful chief of poIice. The mayor instructed Payne to 
deny the council's action. Holcombe then called a halt to the council's in- 
vestigation, declaring that there was no evidence to support the charges 
against Payne. The council again voted to suspend Payne, as it was to do 
twice more within the next three weeks. In an effort to exert pressure on 
Holcombe, the council refused to approve the November payroll voucher 
for the police department so long as Payne's name remained on the list of 
active officers. Holcombe warned that he would not sign the voucher if 
Payne's name was not included on the payroll. At this point, the solidarity 
of the council broke. Councilmen F.L. Holton and S.A. Starkey met with 
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Holcombe in a clandestine session held after the usual business hours, and 
reappointed and confirmed Payne as chief of police. In the meantime, the 
grand jury, which had summoned several city officials-including 
Holcombe-to appear as witnesses, concluded its inquiry with hardly a 
mention of the business that had been the subject of investigation for two 
weeks.43 The turmoil over Payne, which had wracked the city government 
and police department for over a month, subsided. For Roe and McGrew, 
however, it continued. 
In the midst of the chaotic confrontation between Holcombe and the 
city council, Roe and McGrew appealed to the civil service commission for 
a hearing. The commissioners called a series of preliminary meetings to 
decide the merit of granting the officers a hearing. Sharp exchanges broke 
out between James E. Kilday, attorney for the officers, and Richard R. 
Lewis, city attorney, who accused his adversary of using the inquiry as a 
forum to advance his political aspirations. 
Roe and McGrew reiterated their charges against Payne, citing his 
reputed connections with local gambling interests and asserting their right 
to a formal hearing. Lewis argued the same objections to granting a hearing 
that he had presented at the Grota trial. According to Lewis, Roe and 
McGrew were not civil service employees because they had neither com- 
peted in a competitive examination nor received reappointment after com- 
pleting two years of service with the police department. 
Special attorney Elbert Roberts was employed by the legal department 
to evaluate the merits of the case. His task was eased by the Grota decision, 
which was rendered while the commission was still deciding the fate of Roe 
and McGrew. On the basis of the Grota decision, Roberts recommended 
that their requests be denied because of a lack of jurisdiction. The com- 
mission accepted the recommendation. 
Despite the Grota ruling, the two former officers considered an appeal 
to the district The appeals were postponed, however, pending the 
outcome of Grota's decision to continue litigation. In December 1935 
Judge Boyd refused to accept Grota's amended petition, referring to it as a 
legal "monstrosity" concocted by Kilday.45 On August 1, 1936, the Court 
of Civil Appeals, in a decision delivered by Chief Justice R.A. Pleasants, 
reversed the district court and granted Grota his request for a writ of man- 
damus. If such a hearing substantiated Grota's claim that he had been il- 
legally removed, as Pleasants indicated i t  would, the city must, he con- 
tinued, reimburse Grota for the sum lost during the period of his removal. 
The chief justice also restated the position of the court in the earlier police 
cases that the two-year tenure of the state constitution was not in conflict 
with civil service regulations.46 Pleasants based the court's decision largely 
upon the ruling in the Ellis case, finding in both instances that the issue was 
the integrity of the civil service law as it applied to police officers. 
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As in the Ellis case, Grota's success was short-lived. The city appealed 
to the Texas Supreme Court where the decision was reversed.47 The court 
disagreed with Pleasants's contention that the issue in the Ellis case was the 
same as that in the Grota appeal. In the Ellis case, the court noted, the 
rights of a city employee were involved, not those of an officer, as Grota 
claimed ro be.48 The Ellis ruling could not therefore serve as a precedent 
for the judge's opinion in the later case. In reversing the decision, the court 
cited as its authority a Civil Appeals ruling in 1914, which concerned the 
removal of a San Antonio police officer." In that decision, as in the Grota 
case, the issue was whether a position in the police department had been 
legally created by the city when the precise number of positions was not 
stipulated. The court's reply in the San Antonio case was that the position 
was not legally constituted. Similarly, the present court held that because of 
imprecision in the language of the ordinance, the position Grota held was 
not iegally created and therefore he could not claim civil service status.so 
The defeat was complete. No ordinances to correct the defects in the 
civil service program were approved, and the courts placed the police de- 
partment outside the jurisdiction of the existing system. The inherent 
weaknesses in the civil service structure, the two-year tenure provision of 
the state constitution, and the rules of practice and procedure governing 
civil suits (notably the general demurrer used by the citysl) a11 worked 
against establishment of a stable police department. As the arbiters of 
anachronistic laws, the courts became the unwitting ally of the municipal 
spoils system. After the Grota decision there were no cases of police officers 
initiating litigation against the city because of political removals until 1948. 
The Roe-McGrew controversy was not repeated until a fair hearing, sup- 
ported by adequate legal recourse, was guaranteed. Until that time in- 
fractions of the law, discriminatory law enforcement, and political manipula- 
tion were borne in silence as a condition of employment. 
One obstacle to later reform was removed in 1940, when a state con- 
stitutional amendment excluding classified civil service positions from the 
two-year Iimitation clause was approved.52 Supported by reform-minded 
state legislators and approved overwhelmingly by the voters, the amend- 
ment lessened the inconsistency that had hampered the effective admini- 
stration of civil service from its inception in Houston and throughout 
Texas. But passage of the amendment did not insure civil service reform or 
put an end to the political abuses that had plagued the operation of the 
department. Political patronage continued. The structural weaknesses of 
municipal civil service remained, and access to the courts was as difficult as 
before. These persisting conditions, combined with the failure of individual 
police officers to effect change through the courts, provided the incentive 
for a collective effort. 
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